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Abstract
Despite society’s strong dependence on electricity, power out-
ages remain prevalent. Standard methods for directly measur-
ing power availability are complex, often inaccurate, and are
prone to attack. This paper explores an alternative approach to
identifying power outages through intelligent monitoring of IP
address availability. In finding these outages, we explore the
trade-off between the accuracy of detection and false alarms.
We begin by experimentally demonstrating that static, resi-
dential Internet connections serve as good indicators of power,
as they are mostly active unless power fails and rarely have bat-
tery backups. We construct metrics that dynamically score the
reliability of each residential IP, where a higher score indicates a
higher correlation between that IP’s availability and its regional
power. We monitor specifically selected subsets of residential
IPs and evaluate the accuracy with which they can indicate cur-
rent county power status.
Using data gathered during the power outages caused by Hur-
ricane Florence, we demonstrate that we can track power out-
ages at different granularities, state and county, in both sparse
and dense regions. By comparing our detection with the reports
gathered from power utility companies, we achieve an average
detection accuracy of 90%, where we also show some of our
false alarms and missed outage events could be due to imper-
fect ground truth data. Therefore, our method can be used as a
complementary technique of power outage detection.
1 Introduction
Since 1974, the total electricity consumption of the world in-
creased at an annual rate of 3.4% [1], reaching 20,200 TWh by
2015, of which 3758 TWh was consumed in the United States
[1, 8]. Given the crucial role of electricity in society, power
outages from cyber-attacks [16] and natural disasters [23] have
devastating effects with economic, social, physical and psycho-
logical impacts. Blackouts in the United States due to weather-
related outages have increased 5-10 times since the 1990s [17].
Reports by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), EPRI, and
LBNL have estimated $30-$400 billion per year in economic
losses due to power outages [17]. The ability to detect such
outages today relies on power monitoring and diagnostic sys-
tems that are typically realized through wired communications.
However, due to the high cost of installing and maintaining
highly reliable communication cables that are resilient to out-
ages, they are not widely implemented today [26].
These outages and concerns about existing detection in-
frastructure put America’s aging, sprawling power grid sys-
tem under the spotlight. In response, DARPA launched the
Rapid Attack Detection, Isolation and Characterization Systems
(RADICS) program, one of whose goals is maintaining situa-
tional awareness by providing accurate and timely information
about the power grid’s state before and after cyber-attacks [5].
In this paper, we explore the efficacy of identifying regional
(county-level) outages from IP probes. We begin by identifying
properties of IP addresses in each geographic region who are
stable with the power, where we can infer power availability
from their up/down status. To accurately monitor power status,
these IPs need to be scanned frequently (on the order of a few
minutes). Using IP probes has the added benefit that the loca-
tion of the monitoring point can be far from the location where
outages are being probed, and furthermore can be decentralized
to provide additional resilience. Our approach works with both
IPv4 and IPv6 address spaces, although here our work focuses
on using IPv4 probes.
While IP probing has been used to detect outages, to the
best of our knowledge, existing Internet-based probing meth-
ods [36, 34, 28, 15, 21, 41, 20, 19] focus on general Internet
outages, regardless of their cause, power or otherwise. In con-
trast, we distinguish between outages that are not due to power
failure and those which are, and hence perform a more in-depth
analysis of the cause of probes that indicate some general no-
tion of failure. A further contrast with prior work can be found
in §5. Additionally, our method performs its assessment on-
line, with the ability to provide notifications of power outages
as they are occurring.
We demonstrate that static, residential IPs are most suscep-
tible to power by comparing our probe results to data gathered
from utility company reports [4] in over 1500 counties in the
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U.S. We present our process for selecting subsets of residen-
tial IPs to be our watchlist, which is dynamically updated over
time such that the list includes those IPs that statistically are
the most correlated with power availability. Our results show a
correlation between our detected outages with outages reported
by power utilities, whose data we use as a point of comparison.
We show that during massive power outages such as the ones
caused by Hurricane Florence, our method matches power com-
pany reports 90% of the time, with false positive rate and false
negative rates averaging below 10%. Furthermore, we highlight
those instances where IP scans identified outages before power
company data did, either because of human error or because
power reports are delivered at coarser timescales.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
• We design a process that identifies IP addresses who are
stable and their up/down status is correlated with regional
power.
• We show how we design our scanning process to be sensi-
tive to concerns about ICMP flood rate that scanning pro-
cesses of this type produce.
• We demonstrate that we can distinguish power outages
from general Internet outages whose causes may result
from failures aside from power loss.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2, we de-
scribe the challenges we had to overcome in our design. §3
explains our pipeline in detail and describes our method to dy-
namically determine informative IPs. §4 presents our prelimi-
nary results. In §5 we discuss related work. §6 will conclude
the paper with a discussion of the implications of this work and
describe our future work.
2 Design Challenges
Using IP pings effectively to identify power outages requires us
to address 3 sub-problems:
1. How do we ensure that the IPs we monitor are good in-
dicators of regional power availability? In short, we wish
to scan IPs that are up when power is available and down
when not.
2. How can we differentiate between a lack of responsiveness
from IPs due to power failure from other situations that
might induce lack of responsiveness (e.g., BGP misconfig-
urations, DDoS attacks, Internet service provider outages,
etc.)?
3. How do we ensure that our scanning rates are robust
enough to provide useful information concerning power
outages without generating an overabundance of ICMP
floods and background radiation?
Before delving into our solutions to these problems in §3, we
describe these challenges in greater detail.
Which IP addresses to monitor
While only roughly 3.6% of all 232 possible IP addresses re-
spond to pings [27], of this subset, many IPs are not reliable
indicators of power availability. In particular, we seek to avoid
IP addresses that
• are dynamically assigned: there are over 102 million dy-
namically IP addresses [43], and while some may be good
indicators of power, there are periods where such an ad-
dress may be unassigned (and hence appear down) or as-
signed to a mobile device that can remain operational
while regional power is down.
• belong to data centers and big companies that have power
backups and will maintain connectivity during regional
outages. Thus, their corresponding IP addresses might also
remain operational during outages and hence are generally
considered risky indicators.
• after ruling out the above two criteria, may historically ex-
hibit unresponsiveness even when power is up. This can
be for any variety of reasons. Generally, since such IP ad-
dresses show a lack of reliability during times that are not
outages, we prefer to avoid using these IP addresses as in-
dicators.
Our rationale is to generally avoid IPs in classes whose avail-
abilities are unlikely to correlate with regional power status,
build sampling histories of the remaining IP addresses with
which we can construct a measure of reliability/confidence of
each IP address, and weight our assessment of regional power
using probes to those IPs that we judge to be more reliable in-
dicators of power outage. Further details of this process are
discussed in §3.
Minimizing Internet background radiation
IPv4 and IPv6 address space both contain address space pollu-
tion, or unused blocks, which are mainly the result of environ-
mental factors (e.g., misconfiguration, location), rather than al-
gorithmic factors [42]. These blocks will not be informative in
our method, hence we need to avoid monitoring them to avoid
causing unwanted traffic and to minimize Internet background
radiation [32, 42]. While we historically assess the informa-
tiveness of each single IP address, the unused IP blocks will
be ruled out in our automated system. Furthermore, since we
stochastically select IPs with high reliability to probe, if the un-
used blocks start to be assigned to actual entities our automated
system will cover them over time.
Impacting Internet service
Increasing the overall probe rate of IP addresses will, for the
most part, help improve detection accuracy, but can also cause
unintended anomalous behavior, in addition to generally being
frowned upon. The same can be said for frequent probing of
any specific IP address. Hence, we must consider how to effec-
tively scan a region’s collection of IP addresses that are good
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Figure 1: Our pipeline process
indicators of regional power without overloading the region as a
whole, or overloading any particular subset of IP addresses [10].
Bandwidth limitations
In addition to the aforementioned constraints on the probing
rate, the source points of probes may impose their internal lim-
its of probing capacity (we have such a restriction at our insti-
tution). We also must accommodate such source point limits as
well, and if this is a bottleneck, determine how best to partition
the available probing bandwidth among the set of regions being
monitored.
3 Methodology and Design
Figure 1 depicts a pipeline process describing our overall ap-
proach that performs periodic IP scans to determine regional
power availability. As mentioned in §1, we focus on residential
IP addresses for our power failure detection system as they are
more susceptible to power failures and serve as a good indica-
tor. We first explain an initializing stage in which we identify
residential IP addresses (§3.1) and map these addresses to geo-
graphical regions (§3.2). We further refine this list of IPs into
what we call a residential watchlist (§3.3) that is continually
monitored at a slow rate. The residential watchlist is then fur-
ther refined into a much smaller, dynamically adjusted reliable
watchlist that contains IPs that are judged to be the best indica-
tors of power availability. The process of forming and updating
the reliable watchlist as well as the collection and interpretation
of probe results from the watchlist is described in §3.4.
3.1 Residential IP determination
Residential IP addresses are the most susceptible Internet con-
nections to power outages [36]. Henceforth, we study their be-
havior to detect power outages. There are several characteristics
of IP addresses indicating whether or not they are residential.
These characteristics mainly include the ISP names, port num-
bers, and security methods [7]. We use Shodan [6] due to its ca-
pability for gathering a list of host IP addresses categorized by
their ISPs, were we obtain IP blocks belong to the most popular
residential ISPs [21]. Furthermore, to obtain only residential IP
addresses, port numbers 110, 123, 161, and 5060 are avoided as
they are often used for businesses or data centers [7]. In addi-
tion to port numbers, security methods HTTP, FTP, ssh, telnet
encompass non-residential IP addresses and should be avoided
during queries. Therefore, after obtaining IP blocks based on
their ISP, we filter out port numbers and security methods well-
known for non-residential connections. From this method, we
obtain approximately 200,000,000 US residential IP addresses,
which form the basis of our residential watchlist. Since the resi-
dential watchlist consists of CIDR blocks of IP addresses, there
are some unassigned IPs hidden in our residential watchlist who
do not respond to ICMP pings and we remove them in our next
step of reliable watchlist formation.
3.2 Geolocational mapping of IP addresses
After determining the residential IP addresses, we map them to
their corresponding geographical location, resulting in a list of
“GeoIPs". Hence, we can gather information from each specific
region by monitoring the IP addresses assigned there. We use
the MaxMind City database for geo-IP coordinate information
[3]. MaxMind is up to 86% accurate in mapping IP addresses
within a region of 50 kilometer radius according to their support
center website. We then utilize an API from Federal Commu-
nication Comission (FCC) to determine the county of each IP
address based on their coordinates [2].
3.3 The Residential Watchlist
The residential watchlist is formed starting with the IPs identi-
fied above and is then further thinned to exclude any blacklisted
IP addresses, which either belong to reserved IP addresses or
are obtained through an opt-out mechanism where users submit
IP addresses or blocks to be excluded.
Once thinned, the IPs in the remaining residential watchlist
are scanned every 6 hours via ICMP pings by ZMap [22] to
assess their general availability over time. We keep updating
the blacklist as we receive more requests from IP blocks to
be excluded through our opt-out process, and if we find out
about new IP blocks that potentially belong to residential IP
addresses, we add them to our residential watchlist.
3.4 Maintaining and Using the Reliable Watch-
list: DDII method
The residential watchlist provides a set of IPs we consider as
potentially valid. However, not every IP on this watchlist is an
equally informative estimate of power availability. We further
refine the residential watchlist to a much smaller, dynamically
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adjusted reliable watchlist using a heuristic, DDII which dy-
namically determines informative IP addresses. DDII performs
five essential tasks:
1. It scores each IP on the residential watchlist based on the
collected probe histories.
2. At a slow period (every 6 hours), it probes the entire resi-
dential watchlist, building a historical recording that tracks
if each IP on the residential watchlist responds to a probe.
3. At a faster period (a varying time on the order of few min-
utes) it builds a much smaller reliable watchlist and addi-
tionally probes this smaller watchlist.
4. If an unexpected fraction of reliable watchlist is down in
each region, it detects a failure event in that region.
5. In regions with failure, it assesses whether the failure cor-
responds to a power outage by inspecting IP responses
within each ISP.
6. It further adjusts scores of IPs on the residential watchlist
and probing periods of regions based on the results of out-
age status.
3.4.1 IP Address Scoring
Each time an IP address is probed, we record the time of the
probe and the probe result, the latter of which is a Boolean in-
dicator of whether there was a response from that address. The
score of the IP address is a simple exponential weighted moving
average (EWMA) of these responses, defined recursively as
Sj(i) = Sj (i− 1) (1− α) + ασj (i) (1)
where Sj(i) is the score after i probes of IP address j, and σj(i)
is the indicator of the ith probe of j, where we have σj(i) =
1 if IP address j responds to our ping in the ith probe, and
σj(i) = 0 otherwise. Note that the initial condition Sj(0) has
minimal impact on the score in the long-term, as a sample’s
bias fades at a rate of (1 − α)k after k subsequent samples. In
our current implementation, Sj(0) = 0.5 and α = 0.01. These
values initially populate an inconclusive score, but as we build
a sufficient body of samples, then recent histories as a whole
are given significantly more weight than older histories or just
the most recent few samples.
3.4.2 Slow-Period Full Residential Watchlist Scans
Our experiments begin with no information about the availabil-
ity of IP addresses on the Residential Watchlist. To seed IP’s
initial scores, we run scans every 6 hours over the entire res-
idential watchlist. For these low-rate scans, we make a sim-
plifying default assumption that power is always available, and
that a non-response is likely due to an indication other than a
power failure. While this assumption may induce a small error
in assessing a node’s availability independent of power failure,
it generally suffices for its intention, which is to provide infor-
mation about which IPs will most often be available when there
is power.
3.4.3 Reliable Watchlist Scans
In addition to our low-rate scans above, we provide higher rate
scans that cover each geographical region of interest. Each re-
gion has its rate at which these higher scans occur (discussed
below in §3.4.8). Each time that region is to be scanned, a small
(relative to the residential watchlist in that region) subset of IPs
are selected as members of the reliable watchlist. This subset
is scanned, and the results of that scan are used to assess the
power status of the covered region (see §3.4.6,§3.4.7). If the
hypothesis is that the region has power, then this round of scans
is used to update the scores of the IPs on the reliable watch-
list who were probed. Otherwise, the results of the scans are
not incorporated into the IP’s score Sj . Here, we intentionally
exclude these scans from the score during perceived outage pe-
riods to limit the bias in the score of non-responses that occur
due to power outages.
3.4.4 Reliable Watchlist Sizing
For each region R, we define
ER = lim
i→∞
∑
j∈R
Sj(i), (2)
i.e., ER is the expected rate of response to probes in regionR per
scan. Note that the limit of i→∞ is the ideal number of scans
to make sure the score of IP address j has converged to its final
value, but any large value of i could be used for this purpose,
have we used scan data for over a year to determine this score.
A very small value of ER decreases our confidence in our ability
to infer power outage status in that region, as the number of
sample points responding with availability is simply too small
to make any statistically accurate claims. Hence, we do not
track power status of regions R for which ER < 10. Otherwise,
the number of samples within an iteration of scanning of region
R is chosen to be
NR = min{bERc , b100log10(ER)c}. (3)
Note that the requirement ER ≥ 10 is an arbitrary option and we
chose it as a result of a trade off between accuracy of detection
and number of covered regions. Figure 2 depicts the relation-
ship between NR and ER in logarithmic scale. NR grows lin-
early with respect to ER for small values, and then after reach-
ing a threshold, grows sub-exponentially. This is to provide
sufficient diversity in the set of IPs being scanned, but not grow
excessively large as to cause unnecessary traffic sent to a par-
ticular region.
3.4.5 Reliable Watchlist Formation
After determining the numberNR of IPs to add to regionR’s re-
liable watchlist, the reliable watchlist is reconstructed each time
it is to be sampled. For a given sampling, the specific set of IPs
comprising that sample’s watchlist are chosen using a biased
random selection process over the set of all IPs in the residen-
tial watchlist for that region. Specifically, each IP j is selected
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Figure 2: The relationship between size of reliable watchlist
(NR) and the expected response probe rate in region R (ER).
for inclusion in the i + 1st reliable watchlist with a probability
proportional to its current score, Sj(i). Hence, selection is bi-
ased toward IPs that have histories of being active when power
is available. However, the randomness ensures that other IPs
are also sometimes included within the reliable watchlist. This
has two benefits: first, it reduces the overall sampling burden
imposed on high-scoring IPs, and second, it provides more fre-
quent assessment of lower scoring IPs than simply the 6-hour
scans, as both frequent and our baseline 6-hour scans are used
to update IP scores in case no failure is detected.
3.4.6 Regional Failure Determination
For a given scan of the reliable watchlist, we compare the actual
result to the expected result, given the current makeup of the
watchlist. Specifically, the current result is
UR(i) =
∑
j∈R σj(i)
|{j : j ∈ R}| , (4)
i.e., the average up/down status of all members on the reliable
watchlist. The expected result is
ER(i) =
∑
j∈R Sj(i− 1)
|{j : j ∈ R}| . (5)
Where R is the reliable watchlist in region R. We compare the
difference (ER(i) − UR(i)) and when this threshold exceeds a
value τ , we indicate a failure. τ is a parameter whose value
depends on the scale of the failure we wish to determine. For
instance, τ is small (e.g., .01 if we wish to register sub-regional
failures), and can be larger (e.g., 0.5) to register only large-scale
outage events. It is possible to have multiple values of τ ap-
plied in parallel so that in parallel, we can detect small to large
outages. In our study, we use τ = 0.07 as an indicator as to
whether the current sample should be incorporated into the IP’s
scores. However, we vary our decision to report an outage based
on varying values of τ , depending on the size of outages that we
are attempting to detect. Details regarding the selection of τ for
different analyses of results are presented in the §4.
3.4.7 Distinguishing Power Outages from General Inter-
net Outages
A novel contribution of our work is further discerning power
outages from more general Internet outages. Here, our anal-
ysis uses a heuristic that when a power outage occurs within
a region, clients served by the various ISPs throughout the re-
gion should be similarly affected. In contrast, when the problem
has an alternate cause, this typically affects only a subset of re-
gional ISPs. Hence, we indicate a power outage only when all
ISPs in the region are similarly negatively impacted by the ap-
parent outage. In other words, upon failure detection in a region
where (ER(i) − UR(i)) exceeds the value τ , we inspect if the
same condition holds within each ISP, in which case we report
a power outage.
Note that in some rare cases, outages across multiple ISPs
could be caused by reasons other than power outages. For ex-
ample, a shared submarine cable cut or nation wide Internet
blackouts. However, since these events are generally very large,
information about them would become available very quickly
and even though our model would capture a general failure
in these rare cases, after detection and taking precaution, we
would know quickly that there had not been a grid failure. Fur-
thermore, due of lack of data, distinguishing between power
and Internet failures in these cases can be addressed as part of
future work.
3.4.8 Reliable Watchlist Scan Frequency
The rate at which a region’s reliable watchlist is scanned de-
pends upon the current hypothesis of power status within the
region. Associated with each region is a counter CR that decre-
ments every two minutes. When the counter reaches 0, R’s
reliable watchlist is formed, a scan ensues, and the counter
is reset. Let Vi be the value to which it was reset during
the ith scan. Then Vi+1 depends on the current detected sta-
tus. In instances where no failure is detected in the region,
Vi+1 = min(5, Vi + 1), and if a failure was detected, Vi+1 =
max(1, Vi− 1). Hence, we increase the rate of scanning gradu-
ally (up to a maximum of every 2minutes) during periods where
an outage is suspected (to gather more accurate measurements
during this anomalous period) and gradually decrease it (down
to a minimum of every 10 minutes) during periods where power
is assumed available.
3.5 Preliminary Measurements
Figure 3 depicts the IP score distribution within our entire resi-
dential watchlist. The low IP scores represent IP addresses that
do not tend to respond to our ICMP ping, whereas the IP ad-
dresses with high scores frequently respond to our pings. We
observe that there are plenty of IP addresses within the residen-
tial watchlist that have very low scores and monitoring them
would not provide us with much information about the power
status. Hence, we devise our method so that we mainly focus
on monitoring IP addresses with high scores.
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Figure 3: The distribution of IP scores among the residential IP
addresses in the U.S.
Figure 4 depicts the distribution of the number of IP ad-
dresses per county in (a) the residential watchlist and (b) the
reliable watchlist. Note the difference in scale of the x-axis be-
tween these two figures (4 (a) the x-axis has scale 1e6 while
in 4 (b) the scale is 1e2). The number of IP addresses moni-
tored by the reliable watchlists is generally four orders of mag-
nitude smaller than their corresponding residential watchlists,
reducing the ICMP ping flood rate, as well as our bandwidth
utilization. Recalling that we do not monitor regions for which
NR < 10, we do not include the respective county in our study.
Therefore, there is a gap at x = 0 in Figure 4 (b). The reliable
watchlist as a whole is also depicted in Figure 4 (a) in orange
color to permit a direct comparison between residential and re-
liable watchlist sizes.
4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our method using the utility reports
of power outages within the U.S. [4], and Internet scan results
generated by DDII with the average scanning period of less than
10 minutes. Hence, any power outage that lasts over 10 minutes
should be detected. We use the data from the utility reports as
verification of our IP-probe based detection method over 1500
counties in the U.S.; counties in which we have both valid utility
data and enough reliable IP addresses to monitor.
4.1 Existing Baseline: Utility Company Reports
The utility reports used from poweroutages.us combine infor-
mation from over 600 Utilities into one repository, making it the
most complete source of power outage information currently
available. Since this data is the best publicly available infor-
mation and is not based on Internet scans, we use their data to
validate the conclusions drawn by our process. We note that
utility report data does itself has limitations as described in the
data collection process [9]: specifically, it does not include in-
formation of all utility companies, and its reliance on customer
reports can introduce a human error that biases its conclusions.
Going forward, our process could provide further validation and
insight into these reports.
(a) Residential watchlist
(b) Reliable watchlist
Figure 4: distribution of number of IP addresses per county in
(a) the residential watchlist and (b) the reliable watchlist.
Figure 5 depicts the fraction of outages in a period of two
weeks (from Jan 22, 2019 to Feb 5, 2019) extracted from power-
outages.us. Each region’s outage reports are normalized with
respect to their local time zone. There were no major outages
in this period, and the fraction of outages reported follows a pe-
riodic diurnal pattern that peaks near mid-day. We hypothesize
three reasons as to why this diurnal pattern might occur with
drops at night:
• Customers are less likely to report outages at night.
• Fewer utility line workers are available to record and fixing
power outages during the night.
• The smaller utilities that do not have smart meters may not
record outages.
Although the power utility data we are using as ground truth
might be inaccurate at times, especially for small events as
many small utility companies do not report outage informa-
tion online [9], it is useful as a sanity check for our method,
as power utility data capture most minor and almost all major
events. Note that the list of counties included in this dataset is
static, the only thing that changes is the percentage of active
customers.
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Figure 5: The utility reports of power loss within the U.S. from
Jan 22, 2019 to Feb 5, 2019.
Figure 6: The average score and the fraction of active IP ad-
dresses, as well as the fraction of customers with power over a
week. A moving average with 24-hour length is applied to the
results for better visualization.
4.2 Implementation
Our method is implemented on a 64-bit GNU/Linux machine
with Intel Xeon 8C E5-2620 v4 2.1GHz processors and 128GB
memory. To establish the reliability of DDII, we use the heuris-
tic proposed in Section 3, where we randomly select among the
IP addresses proportional to their scores, and we increase the
rate of monitoring of counties during periods of suspected out-
ages and simultaneously stop updating scores until the outage
dissipates.
Figure 6 depicts a national view of three metrics of interest
to our study, measured over a week-long period in which no
major outages occurred. The top curve presents the fraction of
customers receiving power as reported by the power company.
Without any major outages, this value remains close to 1.0 (i.e.,
almost 100% of customers have power). The next line is our
average score of scanned IPs, depicting ER(i) over time (see
§3.4.6), and beneath that is the fraction of IPs currently reported
as up, depicting UR(t) over time (again see §3.4.6).
From Figure 6 we observe that the fraction of active IP ad-
dresses on average is around 0.07 lower than the average score
of scanned IPs obtained from EWMA. Note that this unex-
pected bias of 0.07 is due to a difference that EWMA achieves
when compared with the traditional mean [40]. While we cur-
rently address this bias by incorporating it into our assessment,
future work will explore making appropriate adjustments that
can remove such bias from the EWMA.
4.3 Power Outage Detection Accuracy
As Figure 6 demonstrated, ICMP pings have an expected frac-
tion of success that lies below the fraction of customers receiv-
ing power. Hence, to perform an accurate comparison between
DDII’s predictions of the outages and those as reported by the
power company, a normalization needs to take place. When
declaring an outage of a certain size (e.g., 20% of customers
losing power), DDII’s threshold computations need to be ap-
propriately normalized.
4.3.1 Detection thresholds
We define an outage threshold for utility company data to be the
percentage of customers losing power. Specifically, a threshold
of x% in a county means at least x% of utility customers have
lost power at that time. The utility data is updated every 10
minutes so if reporting is correct, it should be observable within
10 minutes of the outage occurring.
Figure 7 depicts two examples of how DDII metrics compare
to the outage statistics reported in utility records for Robeson
and Lancaster counties as a function of time over 12 days. Us-
ing DDII, as the average IP response rate begins to drop in those
counties, we detect that the areas are suspicious of an outage (7
(a,d)). We can see that both of these counties can detect true
outage using the reliable watchlist. In Robeson, the utility data
measured that the maximum fraction of affected customers in
the monitoring period were 95% of 27982 total customers. In
Lancaster, when the utility data has its maximum drop, 50% of
4913 total customers are affected. Despite different magnitudes
of outages, the DDII method was able to detect an outage in
both. The number of residential IP addresses in Robeson and
Lancaster is 19405 and 1708, and the value of E for them ini-
tially is 138 and 370, respectively. We can see in this example
how sampling a subset of the full residential address space is
sufficient for detecting outages.
For the same counties, Figures 7(b,e) illustrate the scanning
frequency of IP addresses using DDII. We observe that when
DDII detects a failure, the scanning frequency will is increased
and sustains a higher frequency with the maximum rate of
0.0083s−1 until the outage passes. Since in Robeson, the out-
age lingers for longer, the scanning frequency is high for longer.
Furthermore, since the result of our IP probing in the recovery
phase is not constantly above DDII threshold, we observe some
variation in the frequency during the recovery until it becomes
stable.
Finally, Figures 7(c,f) illustrate the difference in outages split
by Internet Service Providers (ISP) for the ISPs in each of these
counties. We can conclude that because multiple ISPs experi-
enced an outage at the same time that the outage was not due to
an Internet outage in one of the ISPs. This allows us to conclude
that these were true outages and not issues with a particular ISP.
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(a) The active fractions in Robeson, North
Carolina
(b) The scanning frequency in Robeson,
North Carolina
(c) The active fractions for different ISPs in
Robeson, North Carolina
(d) The active fractions in Lancaster, South
Carolina
(e) The scanning frequency in Lancaster,
South Carolina
(f) The active fractions for different ISPs in
Lancaster, South Carolina
Figure 7: Two examples of outage detection using DDII versus residential IP scanning, as well as utility records during Hurricane
Florence. (a,d) show IP response rate, outage threshold for DDII, and utility reports (b,e) is the scanning frequency per county
which is automatically adapted by DDII during failure detection. Finally, (c,f) represents the active fraction of IP addresses within
different ISPs.
Figure 8(a) depicts the case where our system detects a fail-
ure and consequently increases the scanning frequency. A fail-
ure starts when at each probing session the fraction of active
IPs falls below a unique threshold defined for the scanned set of
IPs, which can be different in each probing session. In Figure
8(b), we observe both a power failure and an Internet failure in
the failure period, in which the former impacts all ISPs, while
the latter is only caused by AT&T U-verse. The power fail-
ure event is confirmed from the utility data on Sep 16, 2018,
at which point a peak of 7% of tracked customers lose power,
while there where no considerable reported outage on Sep 17
to Sep 18. Note that the y-scale is different in two figures for
better visualization.
4.4 DDII Validity
To begin, let’s consider the case of a major outage to compare
the number of detected outages in the utility data and using the
DDII method. Figure 9 depicts the number of outages reported
by utility companies and detected by our method during Hur-
ricane Florence in North and South Carolina. The legends of
0.5 and 0.7 in utility reports mean at least 50% and 70% of cus-
tomers have reported a power loss, respectively. Whereas the
numbers 0.3 and 0.4 corresponding to the DDII method mean
that the fraction of active IP addresses falls 0.3 and 0.4 below
the IP monitoring threshold, which as mentioned earlier is de-
fined as:
average score of scanned IP addresses − 0.07
We observe that the number of detections in our method is
higher than the number of outages measured from utility re-
ports in the beginning and end of the power failure. The former
could imply the evacuation of the area and less Internet activity.
This could add value to our method by sensing an outage in its
early stage, while the latter could imply slower recovery of the
Internet connections rather than utility reports, which could be
caused by people who have left the area during the storm and
have turned their Internet connections off. The widened win-
dow of our method is one of the main advantages as we are able
to detect an outage before other methods are able to identify the
outage.
To measure the reliability, we compute four parameters of the
confusion matrix—a table that is often used to describe the per-
formance of a classification model. We calculate False Positives
(FP), False Negatives (FN), True Positives (TP), and True Nega-
tives (TN). Figure 11 illustrates how these measures are defined
in our evaluation. FP denotes the number of counties where
we report a false alarm, whereas FN is the number of counties
where we miss an outage event reported by utility companies.
On the other hand, TP denotes the number of overlaps between
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(a) Scanning result for the entire watchlist
(b) Scanning result per ISP
Figure 8: Power failure vs Internet failure in Haywood, North
Carolina, where the reliable watchlist and the residential watch-
list have sizes of 264 and 6082, respectively. The scanning fre-
quency increases upon each detection of failure (from roughly
every 10 minutes up to a maximum of every 2 minutes). This
can be observed by denser data points during the failure period.
our detection and the outages in the utility reports. Finally, TN
includes the rest of the tracked counties in the regions of study.
Using these parameters, we compute accuracy, false positive
rate (FPR), and false omission rate (FOR). The definitions are
summarized in Table 1.
Note that lower FPR indicates a smaller amount of false
alarms compared to N , and lower FOR indicates a smaller
amount of missed outages compared to non-outage events. Al-
though smaller values for these measure indicates better detec-
tion, the larger accuracy indicates a higher fraction of true de-
tections using the DDII method.
Figure 10 illustrates the measures in Table 1 during Hurri-
cane Florence in North and South Carolina, with a buffer pe-
riod of 6 hours. This buffer period means that TP is included
as long as the outage detected using our method and the out-
age detected using the utility data occur within 6 hours. From
Figure 10, we notice that during the peak of the outage, FOR
and FPR are slightly higher and accuracy is slightly lower. This
is mainly because when the number of outages increases, TN
decreases, and with more outages, it is possible to have some
of them mislabelled. Once the outages decrease, our metrics
return to more stable levels. Also, note that some of the false
(a) At least 50% of utility customers reported outage.
(b) At least 70% of utility customers reported outage.
Figure 9: The number of counties with an outage reported by
utility data versus detected by our method with different thresh-
olds. These numbers are measured during Hurricane Florence
in North Carolina and South Carolina.
metric definition
accuracy TP+TNP+N =
TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
FOR FNFN+TN
FPR FPN =
FP
FP+TN
Table 1: Metrics used in our evaluation
positives and false negatives could be due to some shortcomings
from the utility reports [9].
For instance, Columbus is one of the counties for which we
detected a false negative during the recovery period, where the
number of tracked utility customers, the residential watchlist
size, and the reliable watchlist size are 23557, 5566, and 313,
respectively. Figure 12(a) illustrates how the recovery occurs
both in DDII and in utility reports. We observe that the utility
data [4] we obtained does not track the recovery phase and con-
tinues to report an outage, whereas our method shows the power
is going back on. Therefore, we constantly have a false negative
in that county after the recovery. This also highlights an advan-
tage of our method—if the reliable IPs are responding to probes
at such a high rate, then we can safely determine the power
outage has ended, yet the utility records inaccurately shows an
outage. Again, we can see the advantage of our method in more
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(a) Utility threshold = 0.5 and DDII threshold = 0.3.
(b) Utility threshold = 0.7 and DDII threshold = 0.4.
Figure 10: The confusion matrix measures during Hurricane
Florence in North Carolina and South Carolina. The buffer pe-
riod is set to 6 hours.
I
precisely measuring outage windows.
On the other hand, Figure 12(b) illustrates one of the exam-
ples where we had a false positive in our method as the fraction
of customers with power does not fall below 70% during the
hurricane in Jones county. The number of tracked utility cus-
tomers, the residential watchlist size, and the reliable watchlist
size in Jones are 7095, 3328, and 327, respectively. However,
DDII results indicate that more customers have lost power than
what is derived from utility reports. Given the knowledge of
Hurricane Florence and the fact that both the residential and
reliable watchlists reach a response rate close to 0%, we can
most likely conclude that a significant outage occurred. While
there is no easy way to answer which of the results are more
accurate, we believe our method has the ability to add to what
power utility reports have to present.
5 Related Work
The works most closely related to ours are [36, 34, 35]. Schul-
man and Spring in [36] use ICMP pings to determine the re-
sponsiveness of IP addresses during thunderstorms. Called
Thunderping, it checks each IP from 10 different vantage points
to asses if the IP address is down. Padmanabhan et al. [31] fur-
ther use Thunderping data to detect Internet failure events that
Figure 11: The Venn diagram of the confusion matrix measures
and how they are defined in our evaluation. A true detection
is defined as when our outage detection and the utility outage
report are less than a buffer period apart.
(a) Columbus, North Carolina
(b) Jones, North Carolina
Figure 12: The power outage caused by Hurricane Florence in
Columbus and Jones counties. The IP probing through DDII
visually seems to track power status more precisely than utility
reports and residential watchlist in these two cases.
affect multiple users simultaneously, and show that dependent
disruption events do not always affect entire /24 address blocks
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and can therefore be missed by prior techniquesFurthermore,
Aceto et al. provide a comprehensive survey on Internet out-
age detection methods[11]. Even though there is some exist-
ing research analyzing weather-caused Internet failures, which
could be potentially generalized to power failure detection, they
have some shortcomings we try to address. The difference be-
tween previous work and ours is first, we differentiate between
power and Internet failure. Second, while they monitor all IP
addresses known as residential, we dynamically determine how
informative an IP address is on power status as an individual,
regardless of their /24 blocks. Finally, they only monitor IP
addresses upon knowledge of a thunderstorm to observe their
behavior, while we build a system to actually detect the power
failure in their early stage and focus in on areas with suspicious
behavior by increasing the probing frequency in those areas.
Trinocular in [34] introduces an Internet monitoring system
that aims to consistently detect Internet outages in small, “edge"
networks. They do so through active probing, where they use
probes driven by Bayesian inference to learn the current sta-
tus of the Internet. However, false positives in a few address
blocks can dominate and Trinocular’s outage detection must be
filtered for most events to be correct. Unlike Trinocular, Richter
et al. [35] and Dainotti et al. [19] introduce a passive probing to
detect Internet failures. Their approach focuses on offline de-
tection of disruptions in CDN log files and analyzing Internet
Background Radiation (IBR) traffic respectively. Furthermore,
Shah et al. [38] use existing long-running TCP connections to
identify bursts of disconnections and use power outage in Am-
sterdam as one of their study cases in a small scope. The main
difference between our work and their methods is that they do
not cover online detection, while our method aims to detect fail-
ures in real-time. Moreover, these works may not be sensitive
enough to detect small outage events, and finally, their main
focus is on Internet outages rather than the impact of power
outages on the Internet.
C. köpp in [28] introduces an analysis of using Border Gate-
way routing to measure Internet outages. Their methodology
analyzes BGP data dumps and matches outages to IP prefix ge-
olocation. They show how their methodology performs through
case studies of past power outages, specifically in Egypt and
New Zealand. In addition, [20] detected country-wide internet
outages caused by government censorship by analyzing BGP
control and data plane traffic. However, since BGP is a routing
protocol, they were only able to detect large scale Internet out-
ages. This is because Internet Service Providers put in a lot of
effort to make sure that their routing infrastructures do not go
down, even when residential and local business Internet access
goes down. In the case of a power outage, even if Internet usage
does go down, BGP routing might still be online.
Cardona et al. attempt to find if short term weather patterns,
like snow or rain, affect Internet usage and traffic demand [15].
They found that the impact of precipitation was not uniform.
While they were unable to prove that there was a dependency
between weather and Internet traffic, they believe that there is
some correlation. However, they did not address the effect of
power outages on the activity of IP addresses.
Casillo et al. provide a comprehensive survey in power sys-
tems research [18]. According to the survey, the majority of
the work related to power systems has been done in devel-
oping statistical models to forecast power outages caused by
natural disasters such as hurricanes, severe storms, and heat-
waves. [30, 33]. Another major area of focus in power out-
age research is simulating and understanding the impact of
contingency-based outages, which usually result from cascad-
ing failures [18]. These statistical models and simulations give
a good idea in advance of the severity and impact on infrastruc-
ture due to power outages and allow the utility companies to
perform power restoration planning and identify opportunities
to make the power grid more resilient. However, these methods
are not Internet-based. As our results show, monitoring the In-
ternet to detect outages is cheap, can provide us with extensive
information, and it is not prone to human error or direct attacks
to power grid monitoring systems.
Information from social media combined with measurements
in power distribution systems has also been used to detect power
outages. Sun et al. use real-time tweets and a probabilistic
framework integrating textual, temporal and spatial information
to detect the outage [39]. Sevlian et al. use a detection method
based on real-time load and line flow measurements in power
distribution systems, which requires placing sensors at optimal
locations in the distribution system to reduce mean detection er-
ror probability [37]. While these methods are very useful, they
can only serve as complementary data on power status since
they are based on human reports which are prone to human er-
ror.
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) can be used to realize low-
cost embedded electric utility monitoring and diagnostic sys-
tems [12, 13, 24, 25, 29, 44]. However, WSNs themselves lack
the reliability and security of wired network nodes, require con-
stant recharging, and communication speeds are comparatively
lower than wired networks [14].
6 Discussion and Future Work
In this work, we present a design study of a power grid moni-
toring system based on IP probing. Our approach is principled,
using a simple outage-centric model of the Internet that learns
the current status of the power from Internet probes. We mea-
sure the correlation between power company data and our data-
driven from the Internet and adjust our parameters so that the
results of our IP probing better match power company data.
6.1 Minor outage events
Our evaluation analyzed power outages for major weather
events such as hurricanes, which cause widespread impact af-
fecting multiple counties. While DDII can be applied to identify
power outages for minor events, it requires further fine-tuning
to reduce the false positive and false negative rates. Specifi-
cally, based on 3.4.4, further evaluations of minor events are re-
quired to answer questions like: What is the minimum number
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of samples within an iteration for a region for accurate detec-
tion? Does this number vary across counties?
6.2 Real-time outage map
As part of ongoing work, we will implement the design that we
studied in this paper as a real-time live map that shows our esti-
mate of the power system status nationwide. This could poten-
tially allow power companies to investigate counties that may
experience outages in their early stages.
6.3 Learning IP behavior
Another avenue we are exploring includes studying behavior of
IP addresses among different counties more extensively to map
a specific behavior of IP addresses within the reliable watchlist
in each county to a power outage percentage. As a part of this
direction, we can apply machine learning methods to the reli-
able watchlist for this purpose, using features such as average
score of IPs scanned, average score of IPs within the county,
county population, number of IPs monitored in the county, dis-
tance from average score and fraction of active IPs, and similar
information extracted from different ISPs.
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